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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
LEO DAVID REYES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a conditional plea of guilty to one count 
of Driving a Motor Vehicle While License Denied, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of U.C.A. § 53-3-227; one count of No 
Insurance, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of U.C.A. § 41-12a, 
302; and one count of No Registration, a class C misdemeanor in 
violation of U.C.A. § 41-la-1303 before the Honorable Burton H. 
Harris, First Circuit Court Judge on the 27th day of April, 1995. 
Jurisdiction to hear this case is conferred upon the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (1953, as 
amended) and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it 
denied the Appellant's motion to dismiss, on the grounds that these 
* 
* 
* Case No. 950614-CA 
* Priority No. 2 
1 
charges did not constitute a single criminal episode as defined in 
U.C.A. § 76-1-401? 
Standard of Review 
A trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a 
question of law and thus is reviewed for correctness and accorded 
no particular deference. State v. Strader, 272 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 
(Utah App. 1995) 
CITATION TO THE RECORD PRESERVING ISSUES FOR APPEAL 
The Defendant's trial attorney properly moved to have the case 
dismissed on the basis that the Defendant could not be prosecuted 
in separate proceedings for the same criminal episode. (R. 2, 9) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-401 
In this part unless the context requires a different 
definition, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which 
is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or 
modify the effect o Section 77-8a-l in controlling the joinder 
of offenses and defendants in criminal proceedings. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-402(2) 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a 
single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise order 
to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to 
separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a 
single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney 
at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. 
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-403(1) 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a 
subsequent prosecution for the same or a different 
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is 
barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that 
was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-
1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii)was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment of 
the defendant that has not been reversed, set 
aside, or vacated and that necessarily 
required a determination inconsistent with a 
fact that must be established to secure 
conviction int he subsequent prosecution. 
Rule 9.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, 
citations, or informations charging multiple 
offenses, which may include violations of state 
laws, county ordinances, or municipal ordinances 
and arising from a single criminal episode as 
defined by Section 76-1-404, shall be filed in a 
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged 
offense with the highest possible penalty of all 
the offenses charged, 
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or 
information may not be separated except by order of 
the court and for good cause shown. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is 
adjudicating the complaint, citation, or information has 
jurisdiction over all the offenses charged, and a single 
prosecutorial entity shall prosecute the offenses. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a plea of guilty before the Honorable 
Eurton H. Harris on the 27th day of April, 1995. The Appellant 
entered a conditional guilty plea, pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 
P. 2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), to Driving a Motor Vehicle While License 
Denied, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of U.C.A. § 53-3-227; 
one count of Insurance, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
U.C.A. § 41-12a, 302; and one count of No Registration, a class C 
misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. § 41-la-1303. 
The Appellant was charged with the above traffic violations 
and Possession of Marijuana, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
U.C.A. § 58-37-8; and Failure to Affix a Drug Stamp, a Third degree 
felony, in violation of U.C.A. § 59-19-106 after his arrest on 
August 18, 1994. The charges arose out of a single criminal 
incident. The Appellant was charged in the First Circuit Court, 
under case number 941000323 FS, for the Drug offenses, and in the 
North Precinct Court, Box Elder County, for the traffic offenses. 
The Appellant, pro-se, plead to the traffic offenses in the 
Precinct Court. After being appointed counsel in the Circuit 
Court, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Precinct 
Court, resulting in a Trial De Novo in the First Circuit Court for 
the traffic offenses. 
The Appellant moved the Circuit Court to have the above case 
dismissed based upon the fact that he had been previously charged 
and convicted of the Drug charges that arose out of the same 
criminal episode. 
The trial court denied the Appellant's motion finding that the 
acts constituting the crimes were not part of the same criminal 
episode. The Appellant now appeals upon the grounds that the 
subsequent prosecution for the charges were in violation of U.C.A. 
§ 76-1-402. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 18, 1994 the Appellant, Leo D. Reyes (hereinafter 
"Mr. Reyes") , was pulled over by Trooper McKay of the Utah Highway 
Patrol for no license plate. Trooper McKay cited Mr. Reyes for 
driving on denied license, no registration, and no insurance. (R. 
13). In the process of doing an inventory search of the vehicle, 
Mr. Reyes informed the officer that there was marijuana located 
under the driver's seat of the vehicle. (R. 14) 
Mr. Reyes was arrested and transported to the Box Elder County 
Jail. The Box Elder County Attorney's Office filed charges in the 
First Circuit Court for Possession of a Controlled Substance, a 
class A misdemeanor, and Failure to Affix a Drug Stamp, a third 
degree felony. (R. 3) Mr. Reyes subsequently waived his 
preliminary hearing and was bound over to the District Court on 
those charges. (R. 3) On November 1, 1994, Mr. Reyes plead guilty 
to the Failure to Affix a Drug Stamp charge in front of Judge 
Hadfield and the State agreed to dismiss the other charge. (R. 3) 
The traffic offenses were charged in the North Precinct Court, 
Box Elder County. Mr. Reyes, acting pro-se, entered a plea of 
guilty to those charges in the Justice court. When Mr. Snider was 
appointed as counsel in the Drug case, he filed a Notice of Appeal 
with the Precinct Court, resulting in a trial de novo in the First 
Circuit Court. (R. 5-6) 
John Sorge of the Box Elder County Attorney's Office handled 
the prosecution of the traffic charges in both, the Precinct Court 
and the First Circuit Court. Mr. Bunderson, Box Elder County 
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Attorney, prosecuted the Drug charges and was aware of the traffic 
offenses pending in the Precinct and Circuit Court. 
Mr. Reyes moved the Circuit Court to dismiss the charges based 
upon the fact that the charges arose out of a single criminal 
episode and his conviction in the First District Court on the Drug 
charges prevented the State from prosecuting on the traffic charges 
in a separate court. (R. 2-5) 
The trial court denied the motion, finding that the acts did 
not constitute a single criminal episode. (R. 22) Based upon the 
court's finding, Mr. Reyes entered into a conditional plea of 
guilty reserving the right to appeal the decision of the trial 
court. (R. 25) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed error when it denied Mr. Reyes7 
motion to dismiss. In criminal prosecutions, all charges arising 
out of a single criminal episode must be filed in the same court 
when a single court has jurisdiction over the matters and the 
prosecuting attorney is aware of the charges prior to the 
arraignment on the first information. 
Refusal of the prosecuting attorney to consolidate the cases 
bars a separate trial on the matters. 
The trial court committed error when it found that the acts 
constituting the basis for the charges was not a single criminal 
episode. 
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ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
The Trial Court Committed Reversible 
Error When It Denied the Appellant's 
Motion to Dismiss on The Finding That 
The Events Leading To The Charges Were 
Not a Single Criminal Episode as 
Defined In U.C.A. § 76-1-401. 
The Trial court committed reversible error when it found that 
the acts constituting the traffic offenses were not part of a 
single criminal episode with the Drug offenses. 
U.C.A. § 76-1-403(1) and Rule 9.5 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure prohibits a second prosecution for offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode when the offenses should 
have been tried in a court that has jurisdiction over all of the 
offenses and the prosecuting attorney was aware of the offenses at 
the time of the initial arraignment. 
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the prosecuting 
attorney was aware of the charges, and that the First Circuit Court 
had jurisdiction over all of the offenses. (R. 5-6)-1 Therefore, 
the only issue before this Court is whether or not the trial court 
correctly interpreted the definition of "single criminal episode". 
U.C.A. § 76-1-401 defines a criminal episode as "all conduct 
which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or 
an accomplishment of a single criminal objective". 
1
 As a matter of fact, Mr. Bunderson had corresponded with Mr. 
Snider in an effort to negotiate the two cases. (See letters by 
Mr. Bunderson attached as Addendum "B") 
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Mr. Reyes was stopped by Trooper McKay of the Utah Highway 
Patrol on August 18, 1994 for no license plate. It was during the 
inventory search prior to impounding the vehicle that Trooper McKay 
found the marijuana. Mr. Reyes was then booked into the Box Elder 
County Jail on charges of Possession of Marijuana and Failure to 
Affix a Drug Stamp. 
Mr. Reyes plead guilty to the charge of Failure to Affix a 
Drug Stamp and the charge of Possession of Marijuana was dismissed. 
The attenuation between the traffic offenses and the drug 
offenses is apparent. The charges against Mr. Reyes for drug 
violations were a direct result of the traffic violations. There 
was no clear break in time sequence, and all of the charges arose 
out of the same criminal objective. 
Mr. Reyes couldn't have been convicted of transporting 
marijuana under the drug stamp act but for the use of the vehicle. 
The vehicle was in violation of traffic ordinances, further, Mr. 
Reyes was driving on a denied license. His sole criminal objective 
of driving the vehicle on a state road while not registered was to 
obtain and transport the marijuana. 
A recently decided case regarding the use of U.C.A. § 76-1-403 
to join offenses arising out of a single criminal episode is State 
v. Strader, 272 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (1995) . In that case, this Court 
rejected the idea that giving false information to a police officer 
was for the same criminal objective of theft or possession of 
controlled substances. The Court specifically found that the only 
criminal objective Strider had in giving the false information was 
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to avoid arrest. The case at bar is clearly distinguishable from 
Strader. 
This Court specifically stated had Strader given his name as 
a medical doctor in an attempt to cover up his illegal possession 
of the controlled substances, that would have been considered a 
single criminal objective. However, since the facts did not 
establish the criminal objective of giving the false information 
was for the same criminal objective of possessing controlled 
substances, this Court affirmed Mr. Strader7s subsequent conviction 
for the drug offenses. 
In the case at bar, the State offered no evidence that Mr. 
Reyes drove the vehicle at any other time. The only evidence 
presented at the dismissal hearing was that Mr. Reyes sole criminal 
objective in driving a vehicle that did not conform to the traffic 
ordinances was to obtain, possess, or transport the marijuana, 
making his sole criminal objective to transport the marijuana. The 
State offered no evidence to the contrary. 
Mr. Sorge, for the Box Elder County Attorney's Office, made it 
clear that the Box Elder County Attorney's Office was aware that 
Mr. Reyes' charges arose from one single incident. Prior to the 
Judge's initial review of the case, the only reason Mr. Sorge gave 
for the filing of the charges in different courts was due to "the 
arrangement" the Box Elder County Attorney's Office had, which 
provided that all misdemeanor traffic citations were to be 
prosecuted by him, and all the felony charges were to be prosecuted 
by Mr. Bunderson. (R. 5) The only reason for this arrangement 
9 
because Mr. Bunderson did not want to deal with prosecuting the 
traffic offenses. 
It is clear that the practice of the Box Elder County 
Attorney's Office is to segregate all traffic violations from the 
more serious felony violations, no matter the circumstances. Mr. 
Reyes should not have to bear the brunt of fighting off multiple 
charges in different proceedings, simply because the Box Elder 
County Attorney's Office chooses such arrangements. 
Rule 9.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and U.C.A. § 
76-1-403 clearly dictate that in cases involving a single criminal 
episode, all charges shall be filed in the same court and 
prosecuted by one entity. 
The facts of this case establish a single criminal objective, 
transporting marijuana without a drug stamp. Those charges should 
have been filed in the same court. The Box Elder County Attorney's 
Office failure to file the traffic offenses at the same time 
precludes them from bringing forth other charges arising out of the 
same criminal episode. 
CONCLUSION 
In looking at the facts of this case, it is clear that the 
charges against Mr. Reyes arose out of a single criminal episode 
and were intended for a single criminal objective. All of the 
charges against Mr. Reyes should have been brought in one 
prosecution. The State's failure to charge Mr. Reyes with the Drug 
offenses and traffic offenses bars the State from filing additional 
charges against him in another court. 
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Wherefore, the Appellant respectfully requests that the above 
conviction be reversed as a matter of law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ? day of July, 1996. 
Kent E. Snider \ 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the 
following: 
Jon J. Bunderson 
Box Elder County Attorney 
45 North 100 East 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
5trd DATED this 7) day of July, 1996 
Kent E.' ^6id^^^' 
Attorney for AppeMant 
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ADDENDUM "A' 
April 27, 1995 - Tape recorded hearing 
THE COURT: This is the matter of State vs. David 
Reyes, set for trial at this time on the basis of an 
amended information by the State of Utah. Class B 
misdemeanor, driving a motor vehicle while license was 
1
 denied and having, also, under a Class B misdemeanor, 
! 
> no insurance while driving. I believe that's the only 
I 
I two charge s . 
MR- SORGE: Your Honor, there's three charges. 
Driving a motor vehicle while license denied, no | 
insurance, and no registration. i 
THE COURT: Pardon? 
MR. SORGE: No insurance and no registration. 
THE COURT: All right. Those were the two 
charge s ? 
MR. SORGE: And driving a motor vehicle while 
license deni ed. 
MR. SNIDER: The no registration is on page two, 
Your Honor. That's the one Mr. Sorge is looking at. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. Count three, no 
registration. Are you ready to proceed? 
MR. SORGE: Yesf Your Honor, the State is ready 
to proceed. 
MR. SNIDER: We have a motion, Your Honor. I 
li think the State will stioulate to certain facts in 
2 • this case. I believe, Your Honor, that this defendant 
3 [ was stopped by Trooper McKay in his vehicle for no 
I 
4 i license olate on August 18th last vear. That's what 
! 
i 
5 j the charges arise out of is August 18th, 1994. All of 
6 I these occurred at the exact same time and place. 
7 The defendant was also charged, on August 
8 ; 18thf 1994, for possession of marijuana and possession 
9 i of marijuana without a drug stamp, a third degree 
10 i felony and a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant was 
! 
11 ' charaed on those and was booked on those and he was 12 
13 
14 
cited on these. 
He subsequently waived his preliminary 
hearina and went U D to the district court on the third 
15 I degree felony charges and pled guilty to those third 
i 
16 i degree felony charges, entering a plea in front of 
17 j Judge Hadfield on November 1st of 1994. 
i 
I 
18 | I'd like the court, Your Honor, now to 
j 
19 turn to the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 
20 9.5. I'll read from that, Your Honor. It says, 
21 charge, multiple charges — excuse me. "Charged 
22 I multiple offenses to be filed in single court." I'll 
23 give Mr. Sorge an opportunity to find that. Have you 
2 4 found i t yet? 
25 MR. SORGE: Yes. 
MR. SNIDER: "Unless otherwise provided by law. 
complaints, citations or informations charging 
multiple offenses, which may include violations of 
state laws, county offenses, or municipal ordinances, 
and arising from a single criminal episode, as defined 
under 76-1-401,. shall," not may, "shall be filed in a 
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged 
offense with the highest possible penalty of all of 
the offenses charged." That's exactly what the rule 
requi res. 
If you'll turn to 76-1-401, a single 
criminal episode is defined. In this part, "unless 
the context requires a different definition, single 
criminal episode means all conduct which is grossly 
related in time and in incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." 
Now, if you turn to 76-1-402, "A defendant 
may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a criminal — a 
single criminal episode." 
And the most important one, 76-1-403, "If 
a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a 
subsequent prosecution for the same or different 
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is 
1 ! barred. " 
2 ; They do not have jurisdiction over this 
3 : individual. Your Honor, for these misdemeanor charges. 
J 
4 ! The charges were brought in the wrong court. They 
! 
5 I should have been brought in the circuit court 
originally. The State knew they were pending. Mr. 
7 | Bunderson and I had numerous conversations about these 
j 
8 j charges before entering the plea in the district 
9 I court. What they have done here, Your Honor, is 
10 i violated Rule 9.5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure 
11! and have also violated this man's right to be charged 2 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
u er one information for one criminal episode. 
Therefore, they are barred, under 
76-1-403, to continue to prosecute this man for the 
same criminal episode. So we would move to have the 
charges dismissed in this court. 
MR. SORGE: If I may respond, Your Honor, I spoke 
to Mr. Bunderson, who is the county attorney, and he 
has informed me that he had spoken to the court and 
they'd worked this problem out on numerous occasions 
in the past, whereby on felony charges he prosecutes 
felony charges. I'm a deputy attorney and I prosecute 
misdemeanor charges. The court was in agreement with 
that type of arrangement. So, based on the 
information I received from Mr. Bunderson, I went 
ahead and proceeded with the charges in this 
informa tion. 
In speaking with the officer, Mr. Reyes 
originally was cited for no insurance, no registration 
and also driving on a denied license. A short time 
thereafter, albeit a very short time after he was told 
his car would be impounded and such, then he was cited 
for the marijuana and the felony drug stamp violation. 
So two things here. One is, according to 
Mr. Bunderson, there is an agreement with the court 
that we could try these charges separately. Two, that 
it wasn't necessarily one single criminal episode. 
In speaking with Mr. Snider, he informed 
me that if his client came in and if there was a plea 
of guilty on charges such as these, that he would 
appeal to a higher court in order to get a ruling on 
trying misdemeanors separate from felonies. It seems 
to be an issue that has come up more than once in the 
courts. And I told him I'd be in agreement with that 
as well. I'd rather have the issue settled -~ have a 
formal written opinion from a higher court and have 
the issue settled that way. 
In this case, I would argue against 
allowing the defendant's motion to 'dismiss based on 
the fact that there is some question as to whether 
1 is a single criminal episode, then I would ask that 
2 you put that in writing, Your Honor. 
3 MR. SNIDER: Your Honor, if I may approach, I 
4 have the definition of single criminal episode under 
5 ! the code. If you'd like to read it or I can read to 
6 ' it court: whichever you would prefer. 
7 i THE COURT: They got — what's the statute? 
8 MR. SNIDER: 76-1-401. 
9' THE COURT: Which one? 
10 MR. SNIDER: The Utah Rules of Criminal 
11 Procedure. | 
12 i (Pause in the proceedings.) 
! 
13 MR. SNIDER: Actually, this is in the criminal 
i 
i 
14 code itself, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: It's under the Code of Criminal 
16 i Procedure. What number9 
17' MR. SNIDER: 76-1-401. It's under --
i 
18 THE COURT: Wait a minute. 76 --
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. SNIDER: It's in the Utah Criminal Code,Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Yeah, in the criminal code. 
MR. SNIDER: 76-1-401. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Pause in 'the proceedings. 
MR. SNIDER: Your Honor, if you're looking for 
single criminal objective. 
I guess in this case the State's argument 
is that a single criminal objective, he did not drive 
the motor vehicle while license was denied for the 
objective of having marijuana in his vehicle or 
failing to have a drug scamp. He did not have no 
insurance for the objective of having marijuana and no 
drug stamp. He did not drive his vehicle with no 
registration for the objective of possessing marijuana 
and no drug stamp. 
The objective, you know, the marijuana and 
the drug stamp, T can see how those two are closely 
related as a single objective. But in this case, 
we've got minor traffic offenses over here on the 
left hand side and we've got a third degree felony 
over on this side. They're not at exactly the same 
time, there's a brief time incident here, but they are 
somewhat close in time. As you pointed out, I think 
the criminal objective point, the single criminal 
objectiver I don't see that in this case. 
The officer informed me that when he 
pulled Mr. Reyes over he cited him for driving a motor 
vehicle while license was denied, no insurance and no 
registration. He filled out the citation, gave the 
defendant, Mr. Reyes, a copy of the citation and, as 
far as the officer was concerned, he was done with the 
defendant in this case. 
He informed the defendant that we're going 
to impound your vehicle because you don't have 
insurance, no license, that kind of thing. Then the 
defendant, there's a time span here, a few minutes, 
but the defendant comes back and says, sorry, I've 
got some marijuana in my vehicle. The officer says, 
oh, okay. He finds the marijuana and hits him with 
possession of marijuana and no drug stamp. 
I still think that, you know, the officer 
felt he was done with the defendant in the first place 
and had given him a copy of the citation on the 
traffic violations. Then you have this incident out 
here . 
We're not arguing, as Mr. Snider is trying 
to point out, that we're going to hit him once with 
driving while license is denied and then try him again 
two weeks later for no insurance and try him again two 
weeks later for no registration and then try him two 
weeks later for possession of marijuana and no drug 
stamp. We're saying that we had one incident here 
where there was traffic violations. The officer 
filled out the ticket and signed the ticket and the 
defendant signed the ticket and crave it to him. He 
MR. SNIDER: No, Your Honor. I think we could 
argue this all day long. I think the facts speak for 
themselves. I think justice rings out here. What the 
court prefers to do is up to the court. I'll submit 
it . 
THE COURT: As to that portion of your motion 
that it requires, in a single criminal episode, that 
the jurisdiction lies with the higher offense, which 
is the felony in this case, transporting marijuana, 
that is a correct interpretation of what the law is. 
They must be filed as one criminal episode. 
However.. I find, as a matter of fact, that 
this is not a single criminal episode, pursuant to 
76-1-401. That the misdemeanor violations are 
unrelated to the accomplishment of the single criminal 
objective of transporting the marijuana and would deny 
the mo t i on. 
MR. SNIDER: Would the court concede, then, that 
in finding the fact, under 76-1-401, would the court 
concede that although you are classifying it as a 
finding of fact., it is actually the application of 
this law also, and that is that in coming to the 
conclusion of denying my motion you are applying that 
law in this particular case and interpreting that law 
in that manner? Is that what I can --
license denied. So driving a motor vehicle while 
license denied, number one; no insurance, number two; 
and no registration, number three. 
4 | MR. SNIDER: We will plead guilty to the charges 
5 | originally charged in the circuit court. I think 
6 | those are the exact same charges, if I'm not mistaken. 
7 I THE COURT: That's on the amended information? 
8 | Okay. I'll ask, Mr. Reyes, then, on count one of the 
9 j amended information, driving a motor vehicle while 
10 | your original license was suspended, how do you plead? 
11 I MR. REYES: Guilty. 
12 THE COURT: And count two, having no insurance, 
13 as required by section 41-12 ( a ) -302, Utah code, how do 
14 I you plead? 
15 I MR. REYES: Guilty. 
16 THE COURT: And as to driving with no 
17 registration for a vehicle, a Class C misdemeanor, how 
18 I do you plead? 
19 I MR. REYES: Guilty. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 
21 MR. SORGE: No, Your Honor. The State rests. 
22 THE COURT: As to sentencing, do you wish to be 
23 sentenced at this time or do you want that continued 
24 for purposes of sentencing? 
25 MR. SNIDER: We would wish to be sentenced at 
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October 11, 1994 LLJ_ 
Kent E. Snider 
Attorney at Law 
2568 Washington Boulevard, 
Ogden UT 84401 
Suite 102 
Re: State of Utah vs. Leo David Reyes 
Dear Kent 
I have asked Officer McKay to let me know a little bit more about 
Leo Reyes, but I do have to comment en one point.. 
I personally think one of the more serious crimes someone can 
commit is to drive around without insurance, probably 
half drunk or high. Unfortunately, Mr. Reyes appears to fit i 
cateacry. 
;hat 
However, I'll get back to you as soon as I talk to the officer, 
but if you have some kind of brief memo roughed out regarding the 
constitutionality of the tax stamp law, perhaps you better 
proceed with your plans to file it, at least until you hear 
differently. 
truly yours, 
JJBrvll 
on J. Bunderson 
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MONTE R. MUMNS, COUNTY ASSESSOR^ 
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February 16, 1995 
Kent E. Snider 
Attorney at Law 
2568 Washington Boulevard, Suite 102 
Ogden UT 84401 
Re: State of Urah vs. Leo David Reyes 
Dear Kent: 
If we haven' t already ta lked , in reviewing the t i c k e t issued Mr, 
Reyes, I note tha t he i s charged w i y i ^ i v i n g on a denied 
l i cense , nonreg i s t ra t ion , and no prooro^in^ilr^ajiae, 
The vehicle was impounded, so he is going to have to straighten 
out the registration issue before he gets it back in any event. 
Under rnose circumstances, I am concerned, as I told you earlier, 
that rhis jerk is driving around on a revoked license and with no 
insurance. 
If he pleads guilty to driving on a denied license and driving 
without proof of insurance, I would be willing to dismiss the 
registration charge, but only on the condition that he get the 
car legally registered before it is^ r§T}eased from impound. 
yours, 
Bunderson 
JJB:vll 
March 15, 1995 
Kent E. Snider 
Attorney at Law 
2568 Washington Boulevard, Suite 102 
Ogden UT 84401 
Re: State of Utah vs. Leo David Reyes 
Dear Kent: 
Mike McKay, the trooper involved in Mr. Reyes* arrest, contacted 
me on March 13. 
After discussion with him, the best we can do is renew our 
previous offer, that is, we will drop the no registration charge 
if he pleads guilty to driving on a denied license and driving 
without insurance. 
If that is not satisfactory, please get the matter set for trial. 
Very truly yours, 
Jon p. Bunderson 
JJB:vll / 
cc: John Sorge / 
